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Abstract 
I examine responses to norm indeterminacy in the transnational 
context, focusing on regional integration in post-War Europe. I 
argue that the development of the European Union has been 
facilitated by the use of a legitimising device whereby policy 
decisions at a European level are cast as beyond the scope of 
reasonable political disagreement and therefore distinct from 
the conditions which make democracy a desirable political form 
at the national level. This rejection of the political 
significance of norm indeterminacy has led to a widely 
diagnosed trend of “depoliticization” in European politics. The 
paper examines how best to understand this trend, and explores 
how an adapted account of “enlightened localism” might offer 
better ways of coping with indeterminate norms.
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Since the early 1950s, a growing number of European countries 
have committed themselves to dealing with certain political 
matters collectively, on the grounds that there are political 
goals which may best be achieved by some form of transnational 
coordination. Such moves represent an exercise in re-orienting 
political decision-making to contexts beyond the nation-state, 
turning what were once principally domestic issues into those 
of foreign-political negotiation or, in many cases, a new mode 
of political practice that defies categorisation in such terms. 
The range of issues placed in common has steadily increased 
over time, such that what could initially be called a Coal and 
Steel Community (1952-1967), an Economic Community (1957-67), 
and an Atomic Energy Community (1957-67) has come to be known 
as the European Union (EU) (as of 1993), with tasks touching on 
defence policy and law-and-order as well as matters economic. 
As these shifts indicate, multiple political objectives have 
underlain these moves, with varying agendas pursued by the 
parties involved. Yet even amid such pluralism, two core 
objectives are readily identifiable: peace and prosperity. The 
centrality of these goals was evident already in the 
international treaties which inaugurated what came to be known 
as an “integration process,” and they have since been used 
3 
 
repeatedly as justifications for further acts of 
“Europeanization.”2 
Peace and prosperity, and cognate terms such as collective 
security and socio-economic development, are abstract concepts 
indicating normative orientations so broad that few would 
reject them. Yet they cannot tell us in what concrete forms 
they might best be realised, nor do they indicate how policy-
making might appropriately evolve over time in response to 
changed circumstances. They are what, in discursive terms, one 
may call essentially contested concepts (Connolly 1974) and, in 
sociological terms, indeterminate norms (Gregg 2003). Normative 
indeterminacy is present to some degree in all forms of social 
life because the ends of social action are always in need of 
interpretation, and people will diverge in the interpretations 
they make. In many cases, the challenges this poses are easily 
met: some norms are relatively determinate, such as the 
direction indicated by an arrow, while others are so basic to 
social life that a convergence of practice is functionally 
necessary (for example, conventions of pronunciation). But the 
possibility that norm indeterminacy may generate complications 
                                                 
2
 See the Preamble to the ECSC Treaty: “Desirous of assisting 
through the expansion of their basic production in raising the 
standard of living and in furthering the works of peace.” See 
also the Preamble to the Treaty of Rome: “Resolved to ensure 
the economic and social progress of their countries by common 
action to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe, … 
Resolved by thus pooling their resources to preserve and 
strengthen peace and liberty, and calling upon the other 
peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their 
efforts.” Peace and prosperity have more recently been 
supplemented with further normative goals such as human rights 
protection. 
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and disputes is persistently in the background. Indeed, 
democracy itself is arguably premised on this idea: democracy 
understood as a settled – though never static – set of 
procedures within which political actors seek to garner wider 
support for one of the many possible interpretations of this or 
that substantive norm, and to challenge temporarily achieved 
agreements on interpretation with reappraisal. Norm 
indeterminacy represents one important reason for rejecting 
despotic rule. As Hans Kelsen noted, “the impossibility of 
claiming – despite all subjective devotion or personal 
conviction – absolute validity for a political programme, a 
political ideal, imperatively forces a rejection also of 
political absolutism – be it the absolutism of a monarch, a 
priestly, noble or warrior caste, a class or an otherwise 
privileged group” (Kelsen 2000:108). 
That conditions of indeterminacy are largely unavoidable, 
and that democracy is the political form peculiarly responsive 
to such conditions, hardly entails that these conditions are 
consistently respected as such. One move in the interplay 
between power and ideology is not only to “decontest” what was 
contestable, but to obscure that such a step was ever taken. In 
political terms, coping with norm indeterminacy has, in post-
War European integration, often taken the form of masking it. 
As I will show, this may be seen in a whole range of 
developments discouraging and diminishing opportunities for 
applying public pressure to the decision-making process, a 
trend sometimes identified by contemporary European scholars as 
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“depoliticization.” I examine how best to capture this trend, 
pointing beyond institutional changes to some of the conditions 
which have enabled them. Drawing on recent theoretical work, I 
then seek to indicate the kind of “enlightened localist” 
approach that offers an adequate response, highlighting the 
role of practices of transnational contestation in forming an 
appropriate response to norm indeterminacy outside the nation-
state frame. 
 
The Post-National as the Post-Political 
 
A distinctive feature of post-War European integration has been 
the creation of institutions, with considerable powers of 
policy formulation, whose office-holders are not intended to 
act directly as representatives of citizens or democratically 
elected governments. The most notable such institution is the 
European Commission, composed of officials whose job 
descriptions require them to be deaf to the political pressure 
of their national governments. Alongside it stands the European 
Court of Justice, whose role as authoritative interpreter of 
Community law has made it a sometimes decisive influence on 
policy-making. And then there are a growing range of functional 
agencies such as the European Central Bank and Europol 
(Flinders 2004). Such institutions are avowedly independent: 
the European Central Bank proclaims what it calls its freedom 
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from “political interference.”3 Some are overseen closely by the 
Council, the European institution which houses representatives 
of member-state governments. But even this body enjoys 
considerable autonomy from national parliaments and from the 
EU”s own representative assembly, the European Parliament, 
while its discussions and voting are largely hidden from public 
view. In short, the European level displays a substantial 
architecture which is weakly democratic, indeed technocratic, 
in character. 
Underlying the emergence of this regime, and sometimes 
presented as its rationale, is a distinction between national 
and Community interests. In standard accounts, the member-state 
governments defend the former while the independent European-
level institutions defend the latter. Importantly, this 
distinction has been overlaid with another, that between the 
many and the one. Walter Hallstein, Commission President in the 
1960s and, as such, an important influence on early integration 
moves, liked to say that “the Commission embodies the Community 
interest,”4 whereas the Council is the domain of “particularist 
interests” (Oppermann 1979:504-5). National interests (and the 
sub-national interests which compete to define them) are 
treated as plural, whereas the Community interest is regarded 
as unitary and as susceptible to articulation by a corporate 
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 See the ECB”s own gloss on “central bank independence” at 
www.ecb.int/home/glossary/html/act1c.en.html. 
4
 Emphasis added.  
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institutional actor.
5
 In its own understanding, and in that of 
founding figures such as Jean Monnet, the role of the 
Commission backed by the Court of Justice has been to identify 
and safeguard this wider interest and thus overcome the 
tendency of national interests to collide (Monnet 1963:206). By 
giving the Commission (not the Council, nor the Parliament) the 
sole right to make legislative proposals for the Community, 
policy initiation at a European level was deliberately 
separated from member-state control, lest one or several of 
them capture the policy-making agenda and deploy it for 
narrower interests. The “Community Method,” as this arrangement 
came to be known, was premised on the idea that the Community 
authorities at the top of the pyramid were peculiarly far-
sighted for the purposes of “making” Europe -- that they 
uniquely could, in Monnet’s phrase, take the “general view” and 
reveal the underlying commonality of interest which blinkered 
politicians overlooked (Duchêne 1994:366-7; Burgess 
2000:33ff.).
6
 
Moreover, many of those favourably disposed to the 
integration process assumed, quite explicitly in the early 
                                                 
5
 Anticipating what would become the EU”s motto, Hallstein 
suggested: “if federation is unity in diversity, the Commission 
represents the unity and the Council the diversity” (Oppermann 
1979:510).  
6
 The need for a Community-level parliamentary assembly was 
acknowledged but its role was conceived more as a post-hoc 
scrutiniser than as an initiator. It was also intended to 
constrain the Council more than the Commission. For Hallstein 
on the Parliament, see Oppermann (1979:493). Note that Monnet’s 
original vision had been more technocratic still, with a 
stronger High Authority (the proto-Commission) and a weaker 
role for national governments (Duchêne 1994:210ff.). 
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decades of integration, that an increasing number of policy-
areas would need to be given over to decision-making at a 
European level, the only level at which certain technical 
challenges and interdependencies could be addressed. In 
pressing for greater Commission powers, Hallstein spoke of 
“simply following the command of political logic” (Oppermann 
1979:491) and developed a theory of “material logic” 
(Sachlogik) which cast the integration process in quite 
determinist terms. His views were by no means idiosyncratic but 
rather in tune with contemporary scholarly efforts to theorise 
the process along functionalist lines (White 2003; Gilbert 
2008). 
From the outset then, important individuals in positions 
of power sought to shape European integration in terms of a 
dualism: national interests, overseen by democratic 
institutions as inherited from the immediate post-War period, 
and the Community interest, overseen by the obliquely 
democratic, perhaps even non-democratic, “post-national” 
institutions of the emerging transnational architecture. 
Stepping back, one might identify here a continuation of an 
older theme in modern European thought, whereby the European is 
cast as the universal and transcendental in contrast to the 
provincial and insular world of the national or local. The idea 
of “Europe” has this role in more than one system of beliefs, 
whether the nineteenth-century reading of Enlightenment ideals 
of reason, civilisation, and cosmopolitan law or the Christian 
humanist tradition embodied by post-War Catholic statesmen such 
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as Adenauer.
7
 There was, in the emerging institutional structure 
of what would become the EU, more than a hint of the European 
(or “supranational”) as the rational- or moral-universal, as a 
sphere decoupled from the conditions of reasonable 
disagreement, in which the lead role in policy-formulation 
belonged in the hands not of partisan politicians but in those 
of supposedly neutral experts. (No doubt the fear was in part 
that, had policies not been presented as unambiguous goods or 
functional imperatives leaving little scope for debate, 
questions might have been raised about the desirability of 
regional integration more generally.) By contrast, those who 
sought to promote the Community cause were liable to treat the 
“national” as the domain of particularism in its distasteful 
guise: not so much the enlightened local as the parochial 
local. Visions for Europe different from those of the 
Commission were prone to be regarded not as plausible 
alternative perspectives on the “Community interest” but as 
base, even irrational, nationalist sentiment.
8
 In the dominant 
                                                 
7
 See, e.g., Adenauer (1956:47-9) on the promise of European 
integration as a means to preserve for mankind the cultural 
achievements of the Christian tradition. For a more general 
sense of moral duty informing Adenauer’s and Monnet’s plans for 
Europe, see Duchêne (1994:207). 
8
 Cf. Loth (1993:408) on Hallstein at the time of the 
Commission”s 1965 confrontation with de Gaulle’s France: “Pour 
lui comme pour la plupart des Allemands de l’époque, de Gaulle 
n’était qu’un défenseur borné des intérêts nationaux. Il 
ignorait la dimension européene des prises de position de ce 
dernier et il ne voyait aucun intérêt dans les réflexions 
stratégiques qui rendaient l’autonomie de la Communauté dans le 
domaine de la politique de sécurité aussi urgent dans la 
conception de de Gaulle.” Hallstein had little doubt that 
reason and logic were on the side of the Commission and its 
vision of integration, announcing in the midst of the 1965 
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line of thinking, they represented precisely what the Community 
sought to leave behind: the divisions of war-time Europe. 
Today the Union that has emerged from these sixty years of 
integration is commonly described as weakly politicised or even 
de-politicised (Hix 2008; Mair 2005; Schmidt 2006). 
Parliamentary checks have been strengthened over time but the 
essential character of the EU is little changed.
9
 The Commission 
continues to present itself as “the voice of the common 
European interest” (Barroso 2007) and the EU’s decision-making 
procedures still bear traces of this thought. Adopting the term 
“depoliticization” sets this idea in the context of wider 
trends in post-War European democracy towards technocratic and 
juridified forms of government, sometimes termed “distributed 
public governance” in which managerial control is shifted to 
non-majoritarian institutions, the role of elected politicians 
in policy-design is reduced and the political – that is, 
contestable – character of decision-making is set “at one 
remove” (Burnham 2001; Mair 2005; Flinders 2004). As a term, 
“governance” implies decision-making oriented to expertise, 
consensus and efficiency (Tsakatika 2007), and its ready usage 
by EU actors implies a willingness to normalise these 
developments (European Commission 2001). While an important 
                                                                                                                                            
standoff: “No crisis can change the outcome, because in the 
long run reason is stronger than any error: and so the future 
still belongs to us” (Hallstein 1965:13). 
9
 These checks consist mostly of rarely used powers (for 
example, to express no confidence in the Commission) or 
reactive powers of amendment and approval (stronger in some 
policy-fields than others). This set-up encourages Members of 
the European Parliament to seek strength in unity, further 
diminishing the meaningfulness of their political differences. 
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scholarly tradition argues that member-state governments 
continue to be the key decision-makers in the EU set-up, the 
Council remains an opaque institution whose decision-making is 
weakly susceptible to monitoring by national publics: when 
national representatives gather in Brussels they, too, seem to 
acquire a capacity to identify the unique Community interest 
and so dispense with the need for political scrutiny. In its 
dealings with countries wishing to join it, the EU issues 
detailed entry conditions rationalised in the universal terms 
of “standards” and “best practice,” evading dialog and debate 
in which these countries might influence the evaluative 
criteria deemed appropriate to them (Zielonka 2006:57ff.). 
This regime structure is not without supporters. Some 
scholars treat conventional democratic standards as irrelevant 
to what they consider to be essentially a series of interstate 
agreements between national governments (Moravcsik 2002). 
Alternatively, in one line of democratic theorising, 
institutional shifts of this kind are appealing insofar as they 
contribute to the efficiency or rationality of government, 
avoiding the misguided or internally-contradictory outcomes 
that can follow decision-making by voting (Pettit 2001; Pettit 
2004). At the same time, such developments tend to downplay the 
significance of values other than efficiency, such as 
accountability, transparency, and popular involvement in 
decision-making. Moreover, to suppose that technocratic forms 
of policy-making at a European level can be endorsed while 
preserving vital democratic politics at the national level 
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seems doubtful, inasmuch as the one often sets the terms for 
the other. In a phrase “smacking, characteristically, of the 
counting-house rather than the forum” (Anderson 2007:15), 
observers have been speaking for some time of a “democratic 
deficit” in Europe, and while some scholars are willing to 
offer some creative accounting, this deficit appears to be 
rooted in political fundamentals. To explore it more fully 
requires looking beyond matters of institutional design and 
beyond relocations of decision-making authority. It requires 
looking to the commitments these express and the reasons why 
they have proved tenable. 
 
A Supporting Consensus? The Difficult Underpinnings of 
Depoliticised Institutions 
 
Observers note that while transfers of decision-making 
authority may somewhat diminish national leaders” hands-on 
control, politicians continue to set the terms of transfer and 
generally retain crucial powers (Buller and Flinders 2006). If 
their subsequent power is often underestimated, this seems less 
because of the shifts themselves and more because of the 
willingness of politicians to emphasise the limits to their 
capacities. In turn, this willingness may indicate that such 
constraints are found to be acceptable, perhaps even desirable. 
To better understand depoliticization is therefore to answer 
the question: under what conditions does the relocation of 
decision-making authority achieve outward acceptability? 
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One might think that because such transfers are largely 
inconsistent with the expression of political conflicts, they 
must reflect a consensus on the means and ends of policy-making 
– at least in those policy areas thus administered. As Hay 
correctly notes, one of the characteristic features of politics 
in any recognisable conception is that it occurs in situations 
of choice. Where there are no choices to be made, either 
because there is only one viable or desirable line of action, 
or because human agency cannot be exercised, politics is not in 
play (Hay 2007). Depoliticization might then be regarded as the 
withering away of meaningful choices and the substantive 
political disagreements they give rise to. Indeed this is one 
of the rationales sometimes given for the involvement of non-
majoritarian institutions in the formulation of EU policy. 
While diagnoses of the obsolescence of ideas-based conflict 
have been a more general trope of the post-Cold War era, they 
have a natural home in EU discourse, given older notions of the 
Community interest. Some observers regard certain policy-areas 
as unsuitable to political contestation because they entail 
purely regulatory policy-making which, tending toward Pareto 
optimality, benefits some or all citizens while disadvantaging 
few or none (Scharpf 1999; Majone 1998). For example, some 
observers find the transfer to the European Central Bank of 
managerial competences in the monetary domain justifiable on 
the basis of a putative consensus on monetarism (as the best 
means to achieve economic stability) and on GDP growth and low 
inflation (as the principal indicators of stability). 
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Ideological convergence of this sort then implies that 
decision-making may be reduced to problem-solving mechanisms of 
a technocratic kind, with major political choices – for 
example, concerning levels of government spending – rendered 
obsolete or strongly circumscribed (hence the eurozone’s 
Stability Pact, designed to limit member-states’ annual budget 
deficit to 3% or less of GDP). More broadly, policy-makers may 
be guided only by what they consider to be in citizens” 
interests rather than – as in the tradition of national 
parliamentary democracy – what demonstrably accords with their 
will (Scharpf 1999:11ff.). 
But are certain policies so fundamentally incontestable 
that they may be decided at a transnational level with limited 
recourse to public debate? Have the policies instituted at a 
European level enjoyed universal esteem as the best means to 
realise shared goals of peace and prosperity? Such a 
possibility seems remote in light of norm indeterminacy. Norms 
such as peace and prosperity are likely to be subject to 
considerable diversity of interpretation. Policies that might 
realize such endpoints are underdetermined by the concepts 
themselves: they are in need of elucidation, something that can 
be done in multiple ways (Gregg 2003:19, 22, 32). Moreover, 
different interpretations differently weigh the sacrifices 
acceptable to the pursuit of these endpoints. Norm 
interpretation is likely to be especially diverse in settings 
outside the nation-state frame, where a particularly wide range 
of cultural repertoires are deployed (Wiener 2008). Even if one 
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supposes one interpretation superior to all others, 
epistemological barriers which prevent the universal 
demonstration of that superiority are likely to remain. The 
fact that considerable changes of policy orientation across 
time are evident even within the Commission alone reminds us of 
this pluralist tendency: the emphasis on market-led growth 
characteristic of the institution’s early phase was interrupted 
in the 1980s and 1990s by the Delors Commission’s emphasis on 
“social” policies (even as this shift in orientation was hardly 
subject to public debate). A more recent shift has 
resubordinated social policies to the market, now redescribed 
as adaptations to the pressures of global competition (Bernhard 
2009). Such variation in interpretation – variation that can 
hardly be attributed merely to contextual changes - suggests 
that the unthinkability of political alternatives is 
insufficient to explain the technocratic trajectory of the 
Community’s development. In normative terms, such variation 
does not support the idea that legitimate decision-making 
capacities may be placed beyond democratic control at the 
European level and that the European sphere may be cast as a 
post-political one (Hix and Follesdal 2006). 
More likely than deep consensus on the policies 
supranationally administered is the appearance of consensus, as 
well as the appearance that political choice no longer exists, 
even as reasonable dissenting perspectives are available. This 
outcome may follow from the orchestrated efforts of certain 
powerful political actors to marginalise such perspectives, on 
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grounds of perceived interest, or because of a more diffuse 
ideological climate that casts substantive disagreement as 
something unreasonable or dangerous, thus encouraging its 
privatization. Indeed, the two explanations may coalesce as 
efforts are made to solidify the authority of a certain set of 
ideas, and as that authority in turn influences perceptions of 
interest. In either case, one sees “depoliticization” if one 
judges dissenting perspectives (significant if voiced by many 
or if they raise important objections) as insufficiently 
articulated and contested in public debate. Institutional 
depoliticization then marks a “superficial” consensus that 
fails to reflect wider currents in society as a whole. This 
perspective fits well with the elite-driven process of European 
integration, and with the fear that open disagreements might 
undermine its appeal. 
Such consensus is not without cost. Indeed, its political 
consequences are predictably negative, regardless of whether 
one approves of the policies it promotes. Political campaigning 
will start to lose its programmatic aspect as substantive 
political differences cease to be articulated. Citizens will 
then be deprived of the opportunity to acquaint themselves with 
political alternatives and to exert choice and develop 
confidence in their choices. A kind of fatalism will likely 
ensue, undermining democratic practices and leaving consensuses 
and depoliticised forms of decision-making to persist 
undisturbed. Such problems would only be exacerbated when the 
ideas forming the basis of consensus themselves discourage 
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collective forms of political agency. A tendency to cast 
citizens in individualistic terms, for example as consumers, is 
evident in much EU discourse as it is in contemporary political 
discourse more widely, and is likely to reinforce feelings of 
powerlessness before wider socio-economic forces. The tendency 
to diminish popular expectations of what politics may achieve 
points to what “depoliticization” may really mean. For a true 
political community is surely one in which the citizenry holds 
firmly to the basic conviction that political engagement is 
meaningful, whatever the limitations of existing structures. 
This residual conviction needs to persist despite the 
imperfections of a given political regime; only then is popular 
disenchantment toward political institutions likely to take the 
form of critique rather than disinterest or cynicism. Only then 
are citizens likely to interrogate the ideological consensuses 
which more powerful groups in society claim to have identified, 
and to challenge the insulation of decision-making from 
democratic mechanisms. 
Recent EU history has revealed as merely cosmetic any 
would-be political consensus on the policies administered by 
the EU. Though challenged in the past by singular statesman 
such as de Gaulle, it has now been punctured more than once by 
wider publics, as with the 2005 French and Dutch rejections of 
the proposed, highly policy-specific Constitution. While some 
dismiss these results as a return to “nationalism” (if not to 
“populism”), leading back to the very dualisms described above, 
undeniable is that a substantial number of votes cast in these 
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referenda reject policies pursued over the course of European 
integration. These votes are reactions against the attempt to 
suppress indeterminacy in matters of how best to pursue basic 
political goals of peace and prosperity. Whether these 
expressions of discontent signal a new “politicisation” of the 
EU space is a different matter (and they probably do not). 
Referenda provide opportunities for the expression of dissent 
but limited opportunities for the articulation of alternative 
programmes, and even fewer opportunities for their maintenance 
and development over time. Outbursts of disapproval would need 
to be followed by a sustained political focus if they are to 
translate into meaningful and constructive opposition, 
otherwise the dissatisfaction they express might assume 
destructive forms. Even if talk of “politicisation” is 
premature, the idea of a supporting consensus is discredited. 
I would summarize my points so far as follows. A principal 
current of regional integration in Europe has involved side-
stepping the indeterminacy at the core of political 
normativity. The side-stepping has been both institutional and 
rhetorical. Until recently, integration has been widely 
presented and justified to European populations as a necessary 
functional response to certain technical challenges. Attention 
to normative concerns – how best to interpret a rather open set 
of basic goals and to justify integration in terms of such 
goals – has been suppressed in favour of an emphasis on 
technical or conventional concerns (Gregg 2003:19-20). Matters 
of potential normative disagreement have been treated as the 
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preserve of the national sphere whereas European-level 
decision-making has been presented as going beyond the 
parochialism of that sphere. Its alternative has been 
envisioned not in terms of an enlightened localism that 
recognises the contestability of political choices but rather 
as a kind of universalism founded on a technocratic idea of the 
“Community interest” that admits little possibility of 
reasonable political dissent. The conditions that would 
legitimise this technocratic idea – deep consensus – seem quite 
implausible. On grounds of both democracy and political 
prudence, this then seems a poor way of coping with 
indeterminacy. 
 
Enlightened Localism in the EU 
 
The challenge is to imagine ways of recasting the European 
sphere so as to avoid positing it as a consensual, post-
political space in which decision-making authority is beyond 
the realm of democratic control. And the challenge is to do 
this without simply valorising the local, for instance by 
renouncing the idea of a European polity and calling for a 
return to the European nation-state system. The material 
achievements and further potential of regional integration are 
real enough, even if hobbled by a lack of debate over political 
alternatives. Rather than abandoning the pursuit of peace and 
prosperity at a regional level, we might seek to re-establish 
it on a different footing. 
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Gregg’s project of developing a theory of enlightened 
localism, as a politics “overshooting any particular worldview 
without positing some universal one” (Gregg 2003:8), resonates 
with the challenge described. His concern to conceptualise a 
politics characterised by cooperation and compromise between 
those who at the end of the day continue to disagree, rather 
than positing political consensus or some kind of “thick 
normativity” as the basis for social integration, is 
particularly well attuned to the conditions of diversity found 
in the contemporary EU (Gregg 2002:747-8). As a set of 
sensitising ideas, it is richly suggestive and deserving of 
closer attention, even as its application to the problematic 
outlined here needs care. 
The account developed in Coping in Politics with 
Indeterminate Norms seems best suited to a landscape of well-
defined social groupings. Vital democratic life in Gregg’s 
conception centres on groups able to articulate the distinctive 
experiences shared by their members in ways that challenge, yet 
speak to, the viewpoints of other similarly established 
groupings. Indeed, the very ability to distinguish enlightened 
localism from particularism of less appealing kinds depends on 
the presence of identifiable social groups or communities who 
both embody the local and who “overshoot” it by thinking beyond 
their own narrow interests and self-understandings. Gregg 
speaks of “interest-based coalitions with specific political 
goals”; this notion invites open discussion of how interests 
themselves might be indeterminate, and how the groups which 
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form around interpretations of them are contingent. 
Correspondingly, Gregg’s notion of “groups based on shared 
identities” invites consideration of the nature of identity and 
its relationship to groupness (Gregg 2003:52-4). Yet when 
developing the account he deploys examples – generally based on 
US race relations – where these groups and their interests 
present themselves, perhaps to an unusual degree, as self-
evident. “Racial equality,” a norm he returns to frequently, is 
one which refers exactly to groups of this well-formed kind. 
Sensitive as the author is to the dangers of positing 
homogeneous groups – the problem of overlooking internal 
disagreements and power relations within them, and of 
neglecting each individual’s multiple lines of identification 
(Gregg 2003:88) – his account nonetheless takes readily 
identifiable groups as its point of departure (as well as a 
settled political arena in which they act). Because his 
conception of “enlightened” is closely linked to perspectives 
which extend beyond such groups, the existence of well-bounded 
entities which encapsulate the initial localism must be 
assumed. 
At first glance it is unclear what the analogues of such 
groups might be in the transnational European context, and thus 
to what extent the theory of enlightened localism might be 
applicable. One of the salient aspects of this context, due in 
particular to the processes of boundary change entailed by 
European integration, is that not only regulative moral and 
legal norms are significantly indeterminate. Indeterminacy 
22 
 
extends also to what one might call the constitutive norms of 
the subjects of political claims. While one might be tempted to 
see the member-states of the Union as “carriers of the local,” 
this analogy is unlikely given the degree to which they no 
longer resemble nation-states each characterised by a 
homogeneous way of life. The member-states are diverse within 
themselves as well as in the aggregate and thus constitute the 
conditions which might prompt a theory of enlightened localism 
in the first place. At the same time, however, they can hardly 
be considered discrete units composed of well-bounded social 
groups, in part because the processes of integration render 
groups increasingly amorphous, with some straddling national 
boundaries. One thinks for instance of the migrant worker 
communities from Eastern Europe that emerged in Western member-
states following the 2004 enlargement of the Union (Polish 
communities in Britain, for example). These communities are 
fluid in their composition, possibly transient in existence, 
and open up new social cleavages when members return to their 
country of origin after a period of wage-earning abroad. Nor 
can one speak confidently of an emerging pan-European space 
made up of transnational social groupings and classes, at least 
in the short term (Medrano 2009). Further, those most in need 
of representatives who can articulate political claims on their 
behalf (and of “enlightened recognition” by others), such as 
migrants, are those whose lives are most fluid, based on 
patterns of exit and the struggle to find voice. This presents 
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a problem of representation – by whom, and of what – that 
cannot be settled by appeal to established social groupings. 
Such reservations notwithstanding, I propose an account of 
enlightened localism adapted to the EU context. Rather than 
mapping political perspectives onto existing social groupings 
defined by reference to a secondary principle (such as race, 
ethnicity, or class) and regarding them as particularist in 
this sense, localism might be identified in the positions 
adopted in political conflict. Political contestation involves 
the competitive promotion and clash of normative 
interpretations of the public good, with protagonists couching 
their programmes in terms of widely endorsed political goals 
(prominently: peace and prosperity). All such interpretations 
are “local” in the sense that they are contestable, as so 
evident in the context of political struggle. What would allow 
some interpretations to be regarded as “locally enlightened” is 
their success in an expanded political debate. Rather than 
appealing only to a nation-based constituency or a chauvinistic 
sub-national one, such views would be framed so as to engender 
the support of citizens dispersed across multiple EU member-
states – a transnational constituency, even if persistently 
marked by some degree of dissent. Political demands unable to 
muster this wider constituency of support need not be dismissed 
outright. After all, there may be certain desirable claims 
which are best articulated in geographically localist terms, 
and which therefore would need to be pursued in national or 
subnational arenas. But those that did gain acceptance in a 
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debate played out at a European level would have a reasonable 
claim (naturally never beyond dispute) to be articulating a 
wider public good and to deserve recognition as “enlightened”.10 
In this way the idea of enlightened localism may be re-embedded 
in political debate, such that it is a designation made not by 
the scholar in advance of such debate but one generated by the 
outcome of political contestation. As an approach, enlightened 
localism promises a way to circumvent the dualism that has too 
long characterised the commonsense of European integration: 
that of the national as parochial and the European as 
universal. In its place one would have the outcome of 
transnational contestation as the enlightened local. 
So understood, enlightened localism offers the enticing 
prospect of political goals pursued democratically in the face 
of norm indeterminacy.
11
 It offers an image of political 
                                                 
10
 This quality should be understood relatively: depending on 
the issue involved, such a designation may be appropriate 
also in the nation-state context, or alternatively may demand 
contexts wider than the European. 
11
  This reading of enlightened localism is also compatible with 
localism in another of the senses envisaged by Gregg: the 
spatial one having to do with the location of decision-making 
authority. For political contestation at the European level may 
be (perhaps should be) more about the setting of ultimate 
objectives of policy-making than deciding details of its 
execution. The latter may properly draw on local knowledge 
found close to the many sites where legislation is 
administered, yet without generating “parochial” effects so 
long as there is a wider framework by which to assess the 
results of these practices. The relationship between different 
levels of authority is thus contractual or “horizontal” rather 
than hierarchical and centralised (cf. Gregg 2003:15). 
Scholarship on the EU includes attempts to conceive such a 
system, drawing on the idea of “democratic experimentalism” 
(Gerstenberg and Sabel 2002; Sabel and Zeitlin 2007). Given 
their common origin in pragmatist philosophy, these attempts 
resonate well with notions of enlightened localism. While 
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community as developing through adversarialism, much in the 
tradition of conflict theorists such as Georg Simmel (Simmel 
1904). Political contestation of this kind is identified by 
some scholars as already an emerging reality in the European 
Parliament, one that might be accelerated with modest 
institutional changes such as the direct election of the 
Commission President (Hix 2008). Certainly enlightened localism 
would have a logical home in the Parliament, inasmuch as MEPs 
face the task of formulating positions sufficiently “local” as 
to appeal to their constituents at home while at the same time 
being sufficiently “enlightened” as to allow coalitions at a 
transnational level. Yet the prospect of political demands 
being pursued at a transnational level still presupposes that 
citizens themselves are committed to such pursuit. Again, such 
an assumption may be plausible for certain marginalised, self-
conscious social groups with a clear sense of the injustices 
they face and of the concrete changes they seek – perhaps the 
kind Gregg focuses on – but such commitment is more difficult 
to assume elsewhere. Not least because of the consensus-
tendencies of EU politics, political engagement among citizens 
is in question. Voting levels in the 2009 European 
                                                                                                                                            
democratic experimentalism is, like deliberative approaches 
more generally, generally understood as a departure from the 
contestatory politics characteristic of representative 
democracy, the practices it entails – communication and 
learning across multiple sites of political action – is fully 
consistent with contestatory politics in compound or federal 
political structures. Indeed, such an approach seems suited to 
preventing the slide into fragmented and disjointed politics – 
or into parochialism, in the terminology of “enlightened 
localism” – that may follow decentralisation of decision-making 
(though cf. Büchs [2008]). 
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Parliamentary elections were at a historical low (43%) and many 
of those who did vote chose to support anti-system parties 
offering little in the way of a positive programme. With the 
Parliament weakly connected to wider publics, it is likely to 
depend for its animation on outside actors for relevance and 
vitality. 
One such instance in recent European politics is the 
mobilisation against the Commission’s Draft Services Directive 
(the so-called Bolkestein Directive) that began in 2004 and 
successfully broke through an initially favourable consensus in 
the Council and Parliament (Crespy 2009). Led by coalitions of 
national-level political parties, backed by social movements 
and trade unions, and ultimately finding voice in the 
Parliament itself, opposition to the proposals and the 
promotion of alternatives generated significant citizen 
engagement. The episode remains a rare one and subsequent 
failures of leadership (notably on the French Left) prevented 
its consolidation as a political movement. Nonetheless it shows 
what can still be achieved under the existing institutional 
regime and in the face of political scepticism. It is to 
further such campaigns, and to transnationally-coordinated 
political programmes at the national level which build on them, 
that one would need to look for a politicisation of the EU 
space and more generally for the emergence of a political bond 
among EU citizens (White, in press). 
 
Conclusion 
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Regional integration in Europe presents a challenge to the 
political methods modern states have employed for coping with 
norm indeterminacy. In place of institutional structures which 
are professedly democratic, Europe’s leaders have given a 
leading entrepreneurial role to non-elected institutions whose 
independence from political control has frequently been 
valorised. If the national world is then cast as the place of 
partisan and parochial disagreement, the supranational sphere 
assumes opposite connotations as a site of determinate norms, 
where interests and policy-orientations are beyond reasonable 
contestation and which may therefore be left to the 
interpretation of experts and to weakly accountable elites. 
While this way of coping with the uncertainties of 
international politics was arguably an appropriate response in 
the immediate post-War context, indeed one deserving some 
credit for its role in advancing continental security and 
economic development, ultimately it has weakened democratic 
practices at the national level without adequately generating 
new ones at the European level. Such a regime would be 
justified only if the conditions of norm indeterminacy had been 
erased: if there were a strong and readily identifiable 
consensus on the policies administered supranationally. Such a 
consensus seems hard to infer, however, given political dissent 
in recent years as well as cross-temporal variations in belief 
concerning how the basic goals of peace and prosperity should 
be achieved. 
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Encompassing a broad family of responses to norm 
indeterminacy, enlightened localism offers certain guidance 
here, pointing up the inadequacy of casting supranational 
decision-making as a mainly technocratic process and indicating 
why certain related trends of depoliticization are problematic. 
It captures the merits of a politics able to transcend the 
nation-state container while remaining faithful to the 
contestability of claims to articulate the transnational good. 
In a globalising world characterised by increasing transborder 
flows and transnational attempts to respond to such flows, such 
thinking will have application beyond the European context. At 
the same time, any such account must acknowledge the role of 
political conflict and debate in giving definition to what is 
“local” and to what is “enlightened local.” The kind of 
enlightened localism needed in today’s Europe is arguably one 
centred on the pursuit of certain political projects on a 
transnational scale. Enlightened localist standpoints would be 
those that could claim transnational support when pitched in 
this wider adversarial struggle. To be sure, such a scenario is 
challenged by a crucial aspect of contemporary depoliticization 
– weakening public conviction in possibilities for exercising 
political agency. But it also offers the promise of countering 
trends towards disaffection and fatalism, reasserting the 
contestability of how political norms are interpreted and 
applied, and giving reminder of why seeking to influence this 
process is worthwhile. 
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